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DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIREC-
TIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM. By James S. 
Fishkin.t New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1991. 
Pp. viii, 133. $17.95. 
Michael Fitts 2 
Debate over political reform during the last two decades has 
frequently pursued two different visions of governmental responsi-
bility. On the one hand, many point to the dialogic role of govern-
mental institutions, which in their ideal form can refine citizen goals 
and preferences into something like a communal vision of "the pub-
lic interest." Under this view, governmental processes and institu-
tions, and the reform of those institutions, should be evaluated 
according to the extent to which they further means-end rationality, 
a reflective analysis of normative goals, and/or a convergence on a 
communal vision. Civic republicanism, practical reasoning and 
pragmatism are some of the scholarly literatures that have focused 
on this value. 3 At the same time, another classic approach, perhaps 
of an older legal vintage, has emphasized democratic accountability, 
the faithfulness of decisionmaking to the wishes of "the people." 
Institutions and their reform must come to terms, from this per-
spective, with (for democrats) the countermajoritarian difficulty or 
(for law and economic types) principal-agency theory. 
As is true with most other areas of scholarship, a synthetic 
wave of writing specifically looks at institutions and reforms which 
help reconcile major views, in this case attempting to forge what 
Cass Sunstein has called a "deliberative democracy."4 Clearly, Sun-
stein, as well as Bruce Ackerman and others, have made insightful 
contributions that fall into this tradition, as has James Fishkin in 
his aptly titled new book, Democracy and Deliberation. Unlike 
much of this latest scholarship, which tends to be theoretical and 
court-centered, Fishkin's proposals are highly practical changes 
aimed at improving the daily mechanics of the political process; 
specifically, the functioning of the party nominating system. Simply 
put, Fishkin proposes to create a national jury of randomly selected 
party members who would meet and discuss issues at length with 
1. Darrell K. Royal Regents Chair in Government, Law, and Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin and also chair of the Department of Government. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539 
(1988); Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Belknap Press, 1991); Michael Brint and William 
Weaver, eds., Pragmatism in Law and Society (Westview Press, 1991) ("Pragmatism"). 
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 313 (1992). 
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the candidates of their respective parties during the early primaries. 
The result, Fishkin hopes, will be a deeper probing of proposed poli-
cies by the jury-whose votes on candidate preferences, to be re-
ported in a separate poll, might preempt the daily opinion polls 
which often capture only the unreflective impressions of the un-
focused public during the hectic primary season. 
There is much to commend this proposal. Fishkin focuses on a 
serious problem-the rise of candidate-centered campaigns, the de-
cline of reasoned debate during the nominating process, and the 
sometimes tyrannical power exercised by the media during the pri-
mary season, when the public's impression of individual candidates 
may be quite limited. While the purpose underlying this proposal is 
merely to affect the dynamic of primary polls and the public debate 
about them, it may improve the dynamic of the primary process 
overall, which most observers, including many winners, agree have 
serious drawbacks.s Fishkin also demonstrates a reluctance to call 
for sweeping changes, presumably out of fear of the unknown-a 
humility that the history of past primary reforms may well justify. 
Despite these obvious advantages, one is left wondering 
whether this type of approach should be expanded to other aspects 
of governmental institutions. As I suggest below, I would be very 
cautious about extending this model beyond Fishkin's quite limited 
domain. While this incremental reform would be helpful, it should 
not divert us from thinking and writing about more systemic 
reforms. 
First, some background. Over the past twenty years, both stu-
dents and practitioners of politics have come to recognize several 
drawbacks to the current primary political process. In the old days, 
primary candidates were chosen largely by the party leadership, 
with much less popular primary participation or significant public 
primary debate. The theory behind this system,6 which now would 
be put in terms of principal-agency theory, was that democracy-
both in a participatory and a dialogic sense-best occurred between 
the parties, not within them; in other words, party leaders were 
most likely to be held accountable to the public by the threat of loss 
at general election day, not by primary fights within the party. 
Under this reasoning, the threat of an effective opposition in the 
general election would force parties to focus and develop the most 
important issues at the time when the general public was paying the 
5. See Walter F. Mondale, Primaries Are No Test of Character, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 
1992, at A21. 
6. This is aptly summarized originally in E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government 
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942). 
196 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:194 
most attention, participation was at its highest and the issues were 
most clearly framed. Party structures thus allowed for an economy 
of participation and dialogue. 1 
This ideal of party responsibility, however, only has force to 
the extent there are two strong, competitive and responsive party 
structures and the issues coalesce along a clear right/left contin-
uum.8 By 1968, with divisions in the Democratic Party over the 
war in Vietnam and race, many rank and file members viewed party 
leaders as unresponsive. The Democratic primary reforms after 
1968, which substantially increased the importance of primaries, 
opened the process to candidates selected outside the traditional 
party establishment. With the increasing importance of the media 
and public funding, as well as the decline of party identification in 
the public, the nominating process has become a far more open one. 
These changes have had several beneficial effects-the parties 
are more receptive to certain types of new ideas and there is far 
greater scrutiny of the primary political process than backroom 
dealmaking allowed. The rigidities of the party bureaucracies have 
also diminished in many respects. But there are several difficulties 
with the current system, which should not be overstated but are 
real. 
First, making the parties directly responsive to the party pri-
mary electorate may have a tendency to advantage candidates who 
are at the ideological wings. Since the median voter of each party is 
likely to be more at either wing than the median voter of the general 
electorate, and more ideological party members tend to vote in 
primaries, the group selecting candidates in a primary is unlikely to 
reflect the goals of the general electorate very well. While primary 
voters may act strategically with an eye to the general election, they 
are probably less likely to do so than party professionals.9 Thus, a 
primary system may tend to push each party towards candidates at 
its wing-the left of the Democratic Party, and the right of theRe-
publican Party.w 
7. Related to this binary two-party concept of political accountability is a theory of 
retrospective accountability in government. Since parties "captured" government, they could 
be held retrospectively accountable for what had been done in government. This mode of 
accountability was potentially superior to popular directives to the extent the public is consid-
ered better at evaluating the past consequences of government action, rather than directing its 
leaders what to do. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in Amencan Na-
tional Elections (Yale U. Press, 1981); V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Belknap 
Press, 1966). 
8. To the extent political preferences and visions are multi-peaked or stochastic, then 
majority rule itself may have less meaning, except as a matter of agenda control. 
9. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985). 
10. See generally Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (Oxford U. Press, 
1983). 
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Second, the free-wheeling discussion characteristic of primary 
politics may lead to open fissures within the party that cannot be 
repaired for the general election. Theorists of civic republicanism 
and pragmatism envision public dialogue on the issues as leading 
toward identification of common ground and respect for differ-
ence. 11 Whatever may be the case in other contexts, political par-
ties, in order serve the functions described above at the general 
election, must properly frame the issues to the public, maximize 
participation and establish a system for managing debate and con-
flict. To achieve these goals, parties cannot allow all issues to be 
placed on the public agenda, but instead must create institutions 
that will manage the public dialogue. Two political parties-while 
clearly excluding certain issues-have it in their institutional inter-
est to surface issues that will capture a majority of the electorate 
and minimize divisions that ultimately are unlikely to sway the 
mass public. Multiple candidates, in contrast, may not have it in 
their interest to focus public debate on major systemic issues that 
will capture the mass electorate. Indeed, the existence of visible and 
fractious party divisions may be one explanation for the weakness 
since 1968 of the Democratic Party, whose open primary battles 
appear to have contributed to its inability to win presidential elec-
tions in the fall.12 
A third potential problem with the primary system is that it 
may make election campaigns even more candidate-centered, that 
is, focused on the individual personal qualities of candidates, rather 
than the broad public issues. While the line between issues of candi-
date personality and public policy is murky, primaries with a large 
number of candidates seeking to distinguish themselves from others 
of similar political persuasion often focus on issues of personality. 
Not only may little divide individual candidates ideologically from 
other candidates, but the time needed to mount an effective issues 
campaign which will affect the electorate is quite limited during a 
primary. The result is that fewer of the finite political resources of 
the party may be expended on creating the party political capital on 
particular issues, and getting out the party message and vote in 
November.l3 
II. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987); Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism? in 
Brint and Weaver, eds., Pragmatism at 9 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, 97 Yale L. J. 1534 (cited 
in note 3). 
12. See Martin Wattenberg, The Republican Presidential Advantage In The Age Of 
Party Disunity, in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernel, eds., The Politics of Divided Government 
(Westview Press, 1991). 
13. This problem should not be overstated. In many cases the public, at least in the 
general election, may be able to sift through the symbolism and rhetoric of the campaigns to 
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Finally, and implicit in all of the above, primaries can diminish 
the organizational power of political parties, which can be valuable 
in stimulating political participation and election turnout within the 
society, getting things done in government once the primary season 
is over, and generally holding politicians as a group politically ac-
countable for government action or inaction in a world of multiple 
actors and unclear collective responsibility. Given the changes in 
the primary system, and the effect of other political and social 
changes on the decline of parties more generally,t4 politicians un-
derstand that the party leaders and organizational apparatus will be 
less important in choosing candidates. The media, PAC's and con-
sultants are far more significant than in the past in helping to win 
nominations. The result may be a political system where individual 
representatives in government are less beholden to the leadership 
when legislation is needed or decisions need to be made or 
implemented.• s 
Of course, many of these problems can be and are overcome. 
Leaders can and do discuss the issues; the public votes; middle of 
the road political leaders get nominated and win elections; and par-
ties do have inftuence.t6 Yet despite its other advantages, the pri-
mary system can create a burden, a cost of political organization, 
which may increase some of the political problems and costs of 
political mediation, organization and decisionmaking. 
Some of these concerns, especially the rise of candidate-cen-
tered primaries, animate the proposals outlined in Democracy and 
Deliberation. Criticizing our current focus on sound bites, daily 
polling data and early primaries, Fishkin calls for the creation of a 
national party jury randomly selected from the party electorate at 
the beginning of each primary season. This jury would meet with 
the candidates early on for an extended period to discuss the issues, 
and ultimately vote on their favorite. Ideally, the results would be 
widely reported in the public press, overshadowing the daily and 
often distorted polling data which has become so prominent in se-
lecting candidates. If politically significant, such jury polls might 
the substance of underlying policies. See, e.g., Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (U. of 
Chi. Press, 1991). 
14. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic 
Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567 (1988). 
15. The opening up of the party may also have diminished the repeat-player qualities of 
political relationships when there was a hierarchically organized party structure. As a result, 
some might argue, there could be more of a potential for suboptimal strategic behavior. See 
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984 ). 
16. See D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (U. 
of Chi. Press, 1991); Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Parties and Committees in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (1989) (unpublished manuscript). 
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force the candidates to think about and come to terms with major 
issues, which may count for more in an extended give and take. 
There is much to be said in favor of this change. Fishkin fo-
cuses on important issues and their possible alleviation through 
modest, but (as a result) politically realistic reforms. The funda-
mental assumption of Fishkin's approach is that our current polit-
ical institutions suffer from insufficient debate about public issues. 
The face-to-face sustained discussion of the jury would allow a 
deeper analysis, and hence perhaps a greater likelihood of the selec-
tion of candidates who would better deal with public problems. 
While legal scholars such as Frank Michelman and Owen Piss seem 
to locate the greatest source of civic republican virtue in the 
courts, 11 these institutions obviously lack sustained democratic le-
gitimacy. Others have pointed to the Congress, or the federal bu-
reaucracy, as other institutional facilitators of dialogue.1s Fishkin 
would create a new institution-a national jury, which has the size 
advantages of the courts yet arguably greater democratic legiti-
macy, at least in the eyes of social scientists steeped in the theoreti-
cal beauty of random samples. More important, this new creature 
would be incorporated into a part of the political process that is 
characterized by very little systemic dialogue-the political prima-
ries. While a quite modest change, this may help. 
Of course, the mechanics of the proposal may need to be 
worked out. For one, there is no good opportunity for experts to 
participate actively in the jury process. Candidate comments on the 
budget, for example, may be quite meaningless without the opportu-
nity for, or fear of, extended scrutiny by experts in the field. Simi-
larly, interest groups may want their input into the process. While 
there is much negative that comes from organized interest group 
influence, individuals clearly have much to gain from their knowl-
edge of and participation in the activities of such groups. As the 
civic republicans have argued, "[i]nterest groups may be essential 
[to] civic republicanism ... , because they consolidate people with 
common private interests and backgrounds, ... streamline the input 
that the government receives, . . . and provide feedback to group 
members about how the government's ultimate decision addresses 
their particular concerns." 19 
17. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Traces of Self-Government, 
100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms 
of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. I (1979). 
18. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification For the Bureaucratic State, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985). 
19. Seidenfeld, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 1530-31 (cited in note 18). Indeed, absent that 
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While these concerns are admittedly minor, especially given 
the limited use of the poll, there is still something disquieting to a 
democrat such as myself about this approach, and the direction in 
thinking it might reflect about political reform if it were to be gener-
alized.20 On paper, it is ingenious. If the public is incapable of sus-
taining a meaningful dialogue on the issues, then perhaps a 
randomly selected jury of political peers will. The randomness of 
the selection process will give it some political legitimacy, and its 
size and length of operation will provide the opportunity for the 
intellectual depth lacking in mass political institutions. 
Unfortunately, Fishkin's solution to the primary problem-to 
create meaningful participation for only a representative sample-
could run the risk of exacerbating the systemic problem of declining 
public participation, both practically as well as symbolically.21 In a 
post-industrial state, healthy political institutions ultimately need to 
facilitate mass participation and dialogue. Yet Fishkin's approach, 
if generalized, would not only avoid assimilation of the mass public, 
but might further diminish the influence of the traditional party 
structure. To the extent private juries are viewed as crucial in the 
selection of candidates, the importance of the party organization 
could be further reduced. This may be important not only on elec-
tion day, when the organization may not be there to help get out the 
vote, but also in the running of government, when the relationships 
forged between the party elite are useful in getting a president's pro-
gram adopted in Congress and implemented in the bureaucracy and 
the states. Simply put, candidates selected by jury meetings with 
the public may well be less responsive to party structure. 
Beyond its affect on overall participation, it is also unclear how 
much this proposal will ultimately further the selection of institu-
public accountability, it is unclear to what extent the public will pay attention to the poll; like 
the public polling, it runs the risk of being dismissed as a result of the presence or slickness of 
particular candidates. To the extent this is true, dialogue over public issues in a small group 
setting may have its own limitations, which I am sure Fishkin would be the first to recognize. 
20. As suggested above, Democracy and Deliberation is very much a part of the newest 
tradition of scholars attempting to synthesize democratic and dialogic principles in the con-
struction of political institutions. Acknowledging that the current primary system does not 
create a meaningful public dialogue over the issues, Fishkin then turns to a different form of 
representative dialogue-a candidate debate judged by a randomly selected political jury. 
21. The proposal is intended to confront, but does not solve directly, the problem of the 
massive decline in political participation. While the primaries were originally created to in-
crease political participation in the United States, the evidence is that they have had the 
opposite effect. Political participation is at the lowest levels in history in the United States, 
probably skewing the background of the electorate that ultimately makes the decisions and 
perhaps diminishing the quality of the focus of those who do participate. See Walter Dean 
Burnham, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voting Panicipation in Walter Dean Burnham, 
The Cu"ent Crisis in American Politics (Oxford U. Press, 1982); Sam Peltzman, Voten As 
Fiscal Conservatives, 107 Q. J. Econ. 327 (1992). 
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tionally responsible leaders. The assumption of Fishkin's approach 
seems to be that the problem with our primary system is that it does 
not select leaders who are aware of and willing to deal with public 
problems. We suffer from insufficient public debate. 
I have some doubts. Given the extensive discussion of public 
problems in the media, think tanks and talk shows, I am less certain 
that our problems are a lack of cognition as much as a lack of ulti-
mate political accountability of leaders in government, which indi-
rectly frames the nature of debate before and after elections.22 With 
our frequent current state of divided and dispersed political institu-
tions, our leaders and the pqhlic know that elected officials do not 
need to formulate a program dealing with all the issues, balancing 
off the interests of different groups, and forging a communally re-
sponsible plan, for which they will ultimately be held responsible. 
Symbolic stands and vague promises are successful partly because 
politicians and the public know that politicians are unlikely to be 
held personally responsible for the past or future performance of 
government when they were in Congress or the White House.23 To 
the extent this is true, political leaders will be able to talk to the jury 
in private, as they talk to the rest of us in public, about waste, fraud 
and abuse, obfuscating ultimate choice and responsibility. Fishkin's 
plan should improve on the primary system we have now, but we 
should be circumspect, as I am sure he would be, about extending it 
elsewhere; it certainly will not lead to a deliberative democracy in 
this stronger sense. It may simply be a matter of the second best. 
Thinking about political reform has ordinarily focused on the 
extent to which institutions in Congress, the executive branch and 
in political parties frame issues for political choice, stimulate and 
organize political participation, and/or implement communal judg-
ments. As entities with an ongoing existence, political institutions 
generally are thought to perform these roles by overcoming transac-
tion costs, facilitating systemic debate, minimizing collective-action 
problems and promoting collective responsibility. Political parties 
in particular may play a special role in overcoming the costs of col-
lective action and responsibility, although we are only vaguely be-
ginning to understand on a formal level how this is accomplished.24 
Unfortunately, whatever their other values, primaries seem to 
22. See Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (cited in note 13). 
23. For the most part, the political accountability of politicians is retrospective, as poli-
ticians are held accountable for their past actions. Dialogue in this systemic sense is not 
addressed by the Fishkin proposal. 
24. For one insightful contribution along these lines, see David Kreps, Corporate Cul-
ture And Economic Theory, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on 
Positive Political Economy (Cambridge U. Press, 1990). 
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have undermined some of these functions by reducing the signifi-
cance of political institutions to the political process. They can 
force individual politicians into constant direct contact with the 
mass public unmediated by organizations traditionally structured to 
further the goals outlined above. Moreover, as a practical matter, 
while Fishkin's proposal may well help ameliorate the decline of 
collective responsibility accompanying these changes, it repre-
sents-paradoxically-a somewhat similar approach. Like the 
primaries, it minimizes the role of institutions-organizations struc-
tured over time to narrow political choice and facilitate mass partic-
ipation-from the process, both practically and symbolically. 
As an incremental change, it should help. The national jury 
has the advantage of reducing the impact of the ten-second sound 
bites and weekly polls. Taken as a model of government and ex-
panded to other contexts, however, the national jury could be 
viewed as undermining those institutions that historically attempted 
to fulfill that role-in effect, of representative government itself. 
Fishkin's quite thoughtful book is a valuable contribution to think-
ing about primaries. I would be wary, as I am sure Fishkin would 
be as well, about generalizing from his insight. 
